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POLICY DEBATES
Perceptions of regional inequality and the geography of
discontent: insights from the UK
Philip McCann
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the issue of whether the UK displays high levels of interregional inequality or only average levels of
inequality. The question arises due to major differences in public perceptions. Following on from recent UK public
debates, the UK evidence is examined in the context of 28 different indicators and 30 different Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Answering this question involves a careful consideration of the ways in
which we use different spatial units of analysis, different measures of prosperity and different indices of inequality in
order to understand interregional inequality, and the issues that arise are common to all countries. In the speciﬁc case of
the UK, the result is clear. The UK is one of the most regionally unbalanced countries in the industrialized world.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the role of different spatial deﬁ-
nitions, different units of measurement and different
indices of regional performance in articulating the scale
of interregional inequalities that a country faces. These
issues would appear to be largely straightforward, but a
careful examination of the issues at stake demonstrates
that they are much less straightforward than is often ima-
gined. The issues at hand have been sparked by a debate
in the UK media involving high-level BBC journalists,
the international magazine The Economist and a fact-
checking website named Fullfact regarding the extent
to which the UK is interregionally unbalanced. The
debate focused on the appropriateness and relevance of
using the various Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (OECD) regional and urban
data sets and the ways in which these data can be inter-
preted in the particular case of the UK. While the speci-
ﬁcs of the debate explained in this paper primarily
concern the case of the UK, we also explicitly examine
indices and measurements for a range of comparator
countries. By developing a simple and consistent meth-
odological framework, it becomes clear from this
comparative exercise that the issues being debated go
much wider and deeper than just the case of the UK,
and are relevant for understanding the nature and scale
of regional inequalities in all countries. This approach
demonstrates that the UK is indeed one of the most
interregionally unequal countries in the industrialized
world, and this knowledge is essential for understanding
the ‘geography of discontent’ and political shocks which
are evident nowadays in many countries.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section dis-
cusses the background to the debate that recently arose in the
UK media regarding the use and interpretation of regional
economic data. This is followed by a discussion about the
usefulness and interpretation of different measures of
inequality. The paper then explains the logic, construction
and use of the various OECD regional and urban data
sets, and this allows one to revisit the debate between The
Economist and FullFact in the light of the broader OECD
data sets. The following section then expands on these com-
parisons and discussions from nine to 30 OECD countries
and to 28 measures of inequality. As will be demonstrated,
the UK is indeed one of the most interregionally unequal
countries in the industrialized world. The ﬁnal sections pro-
vide a discussion and some conclusions.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT
p.mccann@shefﬁeld.ac.uk
University of Shefﬁeld Management School, Shefﬁeld, UK.
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at https://doi:10.1080/00343404.2019.1619928.
REGIONAL STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2019.1619928
THE BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM
AND THE INTERREGIONAL PRODUCTIVITY
DEBATE
As Krugman (1994, p. 11; added emphasis) famously
remarked, ‘Productivity isn’t everything, but, in the long
run, it is almost everything. A country’s ability to improve
its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on
its ability to raise its output per worker.’ In the UK and
other countries severely hit by the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis, this pithy comment has taken on enormous signiﬁ-
cance in recent years as productivity growth has fallen to
close to zero. In the UK, enhancing our understanding of
the so-called ‘productivity puzzle’ is now central to govern-
ment efforts to regalvanize the economy in the post-crisis
era. Yet, what is becoming clear in many countries is the
fact that Krugman’s observation is just as applicable to
regions as it is to countries. The patterns of regional pro-
ductivity underpin national productivity and the links
between people’s lived experiences and political responses
depend crucially on local productivity as the key driver of
local prosperity (McCann, 2018a). Numerous social sur-
veys demonstrate that people whose life is primarily in
prosperous regions tend to have a profoundly different
view of the world, themselves and their opportunities for
self-enhancement than those who live in low-productivity
regions. Moreover, most people’s perceptions of their pros-
perity and quality of life depends crucially not only on the
productivity of the region in which they live and work but
also on their awareness of the experiences of other regions.
Such awareness obviously comes in part via different elec-
tronic, social and public media, but the most profound
awareness comes from personal experience, something
which is enhanced by geographical proximity. The result-
ing ‘geography of discontent’ (Hendrickson, Muro, &
Galston, 2018; Los, McCann, Springford, & Thissen,
2017; McCann, 2018b) associated with large interregional
inequalities in productivity have profound, and often
dangerous, political economy implications for national gov-
ernance and institutional systems (Chen et al., 2018;
McCann, 2016; Rodriguez-Pose, 2018). Indeed, within
an individual country, the geography of inequality is at
least as important as interpersonal inequality as the source
of political shocks because our democratic political systems
are fundamentally geographical in nature (Rodriguez-Pose,
2018) in the form of electoral districts and wards. It is well
known that intraregional or intra-urban inequality is typi-
cally greater than interregional inequality (OECD,
2018b). Indeed, intraregional and intra-city inequality
still exists even in countries with very low interregional
inequality. However, higher interregional inequality is
associated with higher nationwide interpersonal inequality
(McCann, 2016), so these two dimensions of inequality
cannot be separated. Moreover, it is interregional inequality
that is now fundamentally challenging many of our national
institutional and governance systems. Yet, in spite of earlier
warnings (Barca, McCann, & Rodriguez-Pose, 2012), this
has been an issue that until very recently many people living
and working in wealthy regions, business and media elites,
as well as many scholars working in urban economics
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2018), have tended to overlook entirely.
In contrast, there is now a ﬂurry of efforts aimed at urgently
trying to understand, articulate (Hendrickson et al., 2018;
Collier, 2018; Florida, 2017) and, wherever possible, ident-
ify possible responses to these shocks, even by scholars who
previously would have eschewed such lines of thinking
(Austin, Glaeser, & Summers, 2018).
The UK is a particular case in point. Many scholars
(McCann, 2016) have argued that the UK is one of the
most interregionally unequal countries in the industrialized
world (Gal & Egeland, 2018). Wide-ranging evidence
suggest that on many levels the UK economy is internally
decoupling, dislocating and disconnecting, a reality which
the UK’s highly centralized, top-down, largely space-
blind and sectorally dominated governance system is almost
uniquely ill-equipped to address (McCann, 2016). Indeed,
mainstream governance responses and policy debates barely
address these issues (McCann, 2016) and they rarely ever
appear as headlines in the mainstream London-centric
UK media, and yet the paucity of national media coverage
of these issues is dwarfed by the problematic scale of the
issue.
A recent high-proﬁle example of this disconnection
between realities on the ground and public and media per-
ceptions was highlighted in a recent series of very high-pro-
ﬁle tweets. Between 3 and 6 November 2018, a debate
arose initiated by very high-proﬁle British television,
radio and print-media commentators Jeremy Vine and
Andrew Neil, amongst others, which contests whether
the UK really does have high levels of interregional inequal-
ity in comparison with other countries.1 This was sparked
by Vine’s reading and commenting on a diagram that
ﬁrst appeared in an article entitled ‘Left in the lurch: Glo-
balisation has marginalised many regions in the rich world’,
originally published in The Economist (21 October 2017) in
which the differences in productivity (measured in terms of
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita) between UK
regions (deﬁned as OECD TL3 regions) were compared
with the equivalent (OECD TL3) differences in other
countries. What was presented was the fact that these
differences in the UK are vastly greater than in other
countries, and The Economist therefore concluded that
interregional inequalities in the UK are very high by the
standards of industrialized countries.
The Economist’s analysis was severely criticized as being
misleading and giving the wrong impression by an article
originally published on 26 September 2018 by the website
FullFact.2 The basis of the FullFact claim was that The
Economist was in effect comparing apples with oranges
rather than like for like. The FullFact article then went on
to purportedly demonstrate: (1) the GDP per capita
measures/indices that The Economist was using were inap-
propriate for this type of analysis because they were work-
place based rather than residence based, and as such
overinﬂated the apparent prosperity of places facing inward
commuting and under-valued the prosperity of places facing
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signiﬁcant outward-commuting; (2) the TL3 spatial units
involved were meaningless in that they were comparing
small areas such as The Camden & City of London with
places such as Stockholm,3 Washington, DC, and Tokyo,
whereas a more appropriate comparison unit for the UK
data would have been somewhere like Manhattan;4 and
(3) as a result of the ﬁrst two points FullFact therefore
argued that only regions of similar size should be compared.
On the basis of these points, FullFact argued that when data
are used and interpreted appropriately, the UK displays only
average levels of interregional inequality.
Both Vine and Neil were happy to accept, and even to
advocate via their subsequent tweeted comments, that the
FullFact argument that the UK has only average levels of
interregional inequality was correct. Moreover, while
their views were in part shaped by a FullFact article, the
impression given by the language used in their tweets
strongly suggests that the views of both men also predated
the publication of their tweets, and that the FullFact article
simply conﬁrmed what they already had assumed to be the
case, namely that the levels of interregional inequality in the
UK are largely typical of other countries.
A few days later, on 9 November 2018, Alex Selby-
Boothroyd, Head of Data Journalism at The Economist,
also published a response5 to the FullFact article where he
explained the logic of the approach that The Economist had
used in its article. In response to some of the issues raised
by FullFact, he reiterated some of difﬁculties of using and
interpreting these types of data, and acknowledged that
using TL2 measures might solve some of the problems.
He also suggested that to address the commuting problems
inherent in usingGDP per capita measures, it might be use-
ful to use GDP per person working in an area.
Before we proceed to discuss the details of UK interre-
gional inequality in the light of international evidence, and
also to avoid any further misunderstanding, at this point it
is important to state clearly the position the rest of this
paper explains below:
. The Economist article was basically correct in its claim
that interregional inequality in the UK is very high by
international standards (McCann, 2016; Ofﬁce for
National Statistics (ONS), 2019). This can also be
demonstrated more broadly by using a wider range of
indicators and countries. Meanwhile, the FullFact
article was basically incorrect in its arguments and
interpretation and its claim that UK interregional
inequality was only average in comparison with other
countries, as were the views of both Vine and Neil.
. While in terms of data usage The Economist article is
precise and correct (but requires careful interpretation),
ironically the FullFact article makes exactly the same
types of errors that it claims undermines The Economist’s
article.
. The use of OECD regional and urban data sets require
careful (internationally comparative) interpretation in
the case of each country and the simultaneous use of
different indices allows the better grounding any par-
ticular analysis.
THE MEASURES AND INDICES OF
INTERREGIONAL INEQUALITY
The GDP per capita index – and its related index gross
value added (GVA) per capita – are calculated at the work-
place location, and GDP per capita is the index reported by
The Economist. This is the standard approach used interna-
tionally for measuring the prosperity of the economy of
different places. Measures such as GDP per capita not
only include wage incomes in their construction but also
payments to capital and landowners and investors and, as
such, they therefore reﬂect the overall performance of the
local economies in terms of incomes, proﬁts, rents and
wealth. They are the best overall measure of the value
and dynamism of a local economy, and are the best proxy
for a range of different issues, including the level of
wages, opportunities for high value employment and career
progression, opportunities for business investment, entre-
preneurship and innovation. Assessing differences in the
prosperity of regional economies within an individual
country is therefore generally undertaken by calculating
various measures of inequality in regional GDP per capita
or regional GVA per capita.
A third index of prosperity that can also be used to
assess regional inequality is that of per capita regional dis-
posable income (RDI). This measures the value of people’s
wage/salary incomes, and these are measured at the resi-
dence location rather than the workplace location, as is
the case with GDP and GVA. In a large region that is big-
ger than a typical travel-to-work area, the difference
between the regional GDP (or GVA) per capita and
RDI per capita values (relative to the national average) is
an index of the interregional income-redistribution mech-
anisms operating within the national economy via the tax
and beneﬁts system, whereas in areas smaller than travel-
to-work areas, these differences also reﬂect commuting
patterns. As the FullFact article explains, in places facing
huge inward employment commuting, the per capita
GDP (and GVA) measures (when compared with national
averages) will be signiﬁcantly larger than the RDI
measures, whereas in areas facing signiﬁcant outward com-
muting, the reverse will be true.
While the RDI index is useful for understanding cer-
tain aspects of people’s standards of living – such as their
ability to buy a house and household consumer goods – it
is much less useful for understanding the prosperity and
dynamism of the economy, for two reasons. First, while
RDI is heavily contingent on GDP or GVA, it also ignores
all the investment, proﬁt and wealth-related aspects of the
economy which are included in the GDP and GVA
measures. In the UK, this is especially important because
interregional inequalities in wealth are greater than purely
income inequalities (D’Arcy, 2018). As such, it cannot be
a comprehensive proxy for the dynamism and prosperity
of the local economy.
Second, RDI is heavily dependent on government policy
and political priorities as well as the underlying dynamism of
the local economy. Amore progressive and (interregionally)
redistributive tax system will generally narrow the relative
Perceptions of regional inequality and the geography of discontent: insights from the UK 3
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gap in RDI between high per capita GDP or GVA regions
and low per capita GDP and GVA regions, whereas a less
redistributive ﬁscal system will do the opposite. Yet, the
structure of the ﬁscal system is something that can also
change with shifting political and governance priorities;
while a more progressive tax system ought to narrow the
regional RDI gap relative to GDP or GVA, any movement
towards ﬁscal devolution can also have the opposite effect
depending on the scale and structure of the underlying ﬁscal
stabilizer system.6 The per capita RDI index is therefore
dependent on a combination of both the per capita GDP
(or GVA) indices and also political priorities.
In general, therefore, GDP per capita and GVA per
capita indices are much more encompassing than purely
measures of either per capita RDI for understanding the
prosperity of places.7 Each issue is well understood in econ-
omic geography and GDP (or GVA) per capita is almost
always the preferred measure of local economic prosperity
used around world in economic analyses. What The Econ-
omist did was simply accept standard practice.
THE REGIONAL AND URBAN DATA
Within an individual country, the differing sizes, shapes
and deﬁnitions of cities and regions makes comparisons
complicated because we need to ﬁnd broadly comparable
units of measurement in order to compare like with like.
Moreover, the appropriate deﬁnitional unit also depends
on exactly what it is we are trying to measure and why.
When comparing cities and regions across countries, the
situation becomes even more complex because data are col-
lected and reported in different ways in different countries,
depending on their administrative and governance struc-
tures. These points were raised in the FullFact article,
although there is nothing new in these points. The problem
was ﬁrst raised more than 80 years ago, although the stat-
istical properties of these issues have been well understood
in economic geography for more than four decades under
the umbrella term modiﬁable areal unit problem
(MAUP) (Openshaw & Taylor, 1979).
Precisely because of these caveats, the work of the
OECD over more than a decade has been explicitly to
develop economic and social indicators of regions and cities
that are broadly comparable across countries. This is done
by developing a standardized classiﬁcation system that
allows for different types of subnational data from different
countries to be grouped into categories that allow for mean-
ingful cross-country comparisons. For present purposes,
the OECD standardized classiﬁcation system has three
different dimensions to it, namely: the OECD Territorial
Level 2 classiﬁcation (TL2); the OECD Territorial Level
3 classiﬁcation (TL3); and the OECD metropolitan
Urban Data. These data sets are for the most part also stan-
dardized and consistent with the EU Eurostat Regional
data sets, and are all publicly available.8
The OECD TL2 classiﬁcation is the highest level of
subnational national data disaggregation available for large
regions within countries. For example, in the case of the
UK, there are 12 such regions, with an average population
of 5.45million people; for TL2 regions in theUnited States,
the average population size is 6.3 million; for French TL2
regions, it is 4.97 million; in Germany, it is 5.15 million;
in South Korea, it is 7.32 million; in Australia, it is 3.1
million; in Canada, it is 2.79 million; in Mexico, it is 3.9
million; and in Belgium, it is 3.7 million. At the upper
and lower extremes, we have Japanese TL2 regions with
an average population of 12.2 million; and New Zealand
regions with an average population of 335,000. Of the 33
countries in the OECD database, just four have an average
TL2 population size < 1million, three whose population is >
6million, and 24 whose TL2 population sizes are between 1
and 4million. The average size of theUKTL2 regions ranks
as fourth in the OECD, after Japan, Korea and the United
States, and the third largest relative to the national popu-
lation after Korea and Japan.
The OECD TL3 classiﬁcation is the next level below
TL2 and describes smaller areas that are contained in
groups inside the larger TL2 areas. In the case of the
UK, there are 173 TL3 regions, with an average population
of 378,000 people; for French TL3 regions, it is 672,000;
for German TL3 regions, it is 204,000, in Australia, it is
494,000; in Mexico, it is 585,000; and in Belgium, it is
257,000. At the upper and lower extremes, we have Korean
TL2 regions with an average population of 3 million and
Canadian TL3 regions with an average population of
123,000. Of the 33 countries in the OECD database,
there are just two whose average TL3 population size is <
200,000, four whose average TL3 population is >
800,000 million, and 27 whose TL2 population sizes are
between 200,000 and 799,000. In terms of average popu-
lation size, the UK TL3 areas rank as the 19th largest
out of 33 countries, and are very close to both the
OECD mean and medians for TL3 regions.
Unsurprisingly, because the TL3 regions are very much
smaller than the TL2 regions (typically TL3 regions are <
10% of the size of TL2 regions), the interregional dispersion
and variability in measures such as GDP per capita and RDI
per capita is much greater for TL3 than for TL2 measures.
Moreover, in general, the smaller are the regions compared
with national population, the greater will be the expected dis-
persion and variability in measures such as GDP per capita
and RDI per capita. By OECD averages, the UK has large
TL2 regions (in both absolute and relative terms) and very
typically sized TL3 regions. This suggests that, if anything,
the UK TL2 structure ought to reduce the UK’s measured
interregional inequality relative to other countries, while the
UK TL3 deﬁnitions will have no such effect. There is, how-
ever, just one exception to these broad principles, namely the
fact that the UK is the only country in which London, as the
UK’s major urban area, is subdivided into various TL3
regions, whereas in other countries the dominant cities are
not subdivided at the TL3 level. The only other exception
is theUnited States, where theDistrict of Columbia, a subdi-
vision of the city of Washington, appears at the TL2 level.
The TL3 classiﬁcation system is the one used in the original
diagram published in The Economist.
Finally, the OECD metropolitan Urban data set that is
based on a different classiﬁcation system (OECD, 2012)
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deﬁned according to both commuting ﬂows and the conti-
guity of areas. This provides standardized data for urban
areas of > 500,000 people, of which there are 15 such
areas in the UK.9 For example, the TL2 deﬁnition of
Greater London is the one that is typically understood in
the UK and which has a population of 8.1 million people,
whereas the OECD metro deﬁnition of London has a
population of 12.1 million and includes towns such as
Guildford, St Albans and Reading and many small-town,
intermediate rural areas close to London which exhibit
high levels of outward employment commuting to London.
The GDP per capita of the OECD metro deﬁnition of
London is therefore, unsurprisingly, much lower than the
TL2 deﬁnition of London contained within the ofﬁcial
London boundaries of the London built-up area.
However, moving from the TL2 to the metro deﬁnition
does not necessarily always imply increasing population.
For example, the TL2 deﬁnition of Paris, which is the
Ile-de-France deﬁnition most people are accustomed to,
has a population of 11.9 million, while the OECD metro
deﬁnition of Paris also has a population of 11.9 million
(McCann, 2016). Meanwhile, the OECD metro popu-
lations of Birmingham and Manchester are 1.92 and 1.85
million people, respectively, both of which are markedly
smaller than the standard UK understanding of the sizes
of the West Midlands and Greater Manchester conurba-
tions, which are currently 2.83 and 2.79 million, respect-
ively. This is also the case for New York, which at 16.12
million is markedly smaller than the standard 20.3 million
US standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) deﬁ-
nition of the New York City metropolitan area. In contrast
the OECD metro deﬁnition of Los Angeles has a popu-
lation of 17.72 million, whereas the SMSA deﬁnition of
Los Angeles has a population of 12.8 million. For almost
all cities, the deﬁned OECD metro urban areas are smaller
than TL2 regions and larger than TL3 regions, but as with
London, there are a very small number of exceptions.
The ﬁrst point to make is that these three OECD data
sets are by far the most detailed, accurate and representative
data sets anywhere in the world for undertaking cross-
country comparisons of the internal economic geography
of different countries. Precisely which data set(s) will be
used depends on the particular issue being addressed, but
what should not be done is using data from different data
sets interchangeably or mixed together. TL2 data should
almost always only be compared with other TL2 data,
TL3 with other TL3 data, metro urban data with other
metro urban data. The only exception here is when com-
parison data are not available within a particular classiﬁ-
cation system, in which case comparison may sometimes
be made with other classiﬁcations of data, although this
should always be clearly noted, and appropriate caution in
interpretation exercised.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIST
VERSUS FULLFACT DEBATE
The Economist article used the simplest measure of interre-
gional inequality, which is the absolute difference between
the richest and poorest regions deﬁned in terms of GDP
per capita divided by national average GDP per capita.
The countries it compared with the UK were other large
OECD countries, namely: Spain, United States, France,
Germany, Italy, South Korea, Japan and Sweden. In mak-
ing the interregional inequality comparisons, The Economist
article was entirely correct in only using a single data set
classiﬁcation scheme for its cross-country comparisons,
and it chose to use the TL3 data set classiﬁcation, except
for the case of the United States for which GDP per capita
data are only available at the TL2 level, exactly as reported.
The Economist demonstrated that when calculated at the
TL3 level, the UK is more unequal than any other indus-
trialized country. The question here, then, is whether the
results and interpretation of The Economist were simply
an artefact of choosing the TL3 level as its particular com-
parison data set rather than a more general description of
the UK economy. On both counts the answer is ‘no’.
We can begin by undertaking more or less exactly same
exercises, using the same nine countries as comparators,
that both The Economist and FullFact used, but now we
use the per capita GDP measures at both the TL2 and
TL3 classiﬁcations. At each TL2 and TL3 level, data per-
mitting, we can measure regional inequality in ﬁve different
ways, namely:
(1) Calculate the ratio of the highest per capita GDP
region divided by the lowest GDP per capita region.
(2) Calculate the absolute difference between the GDP
per capita of the highest and lowest regions and divide
them by the average GDP per capita for the whole
country.
(3) Calculate the ratio of the highest 10% GDP per capita
regions divided by the lowest 10% GDP per capita
regions.
(4) Calculate the ratio of the highest 20% GDP per capita
regions divided by the lowest 20% GDP per capita
regions.
(5) Calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of inequality across all
regions.
At the TL2 level using GDP per capita as our regional
index, we see that the UK is ranked as the third most inter-
regionally unequal country in the group according to
method (1) after the United States and Italy; the second
most unequal country according to method (2) after the
United States; the most interregionally unequal country
according methods (3); and the second most unequal
country according to methods (4) and (5) after Italy. How-
ever, the US result according to method (2) depends
entirely on Washington, DC, being in the TL2 grouping.
With a population of only 681,170, the population of
the District of Columbia is only 11% of the OECD
metro population of Washington and < 7% of the standard
Washington metropolitan deﬁnition (Washington DC–
Baltimore–Maryland–North Virginia), which is used in
the United States, and using this particular aerial measure
alongside other TL2 data risks making exactly the same
mistake that the FullFact article claims The Economist
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was doing by using the Camden & City of London TL3
region in its article. Therefore, if we remove the District
of Columbia and use the rest of the US TL2 areas, the
UK now becomes interregionally the most unequal country
in this particular OECD grouping according to method
(2). As such, amongst this nine-country grouping, the
UK emerges as the second most interregionally unequal
country.
As above with GDP per capita, if we consider RDI, we
can measure interregional inequality again in the same ﬁve
different ways, namely:
(1) Calculate the ratio of the highest RDI region divided
by the lowest RDI region.
(2) Calculate the absolute difference between the RDI of
the highest and lowest regions and divide them by
the average DI for the whole country.
(3) Calculate the ratio of the highest 10% RDI regions
divided by the lowest 10% RDI regions.
(4) Calculate the ratio of the highest 20% RDI regions
divided by the lowest 20% RDI regions.
(5) Calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of inequality across all
regions.
At the TL2 level amongst this particular group of
countries, when using the RDI index, the UK is the 4th
most interregionally unequal country after the Italy, the
United States and Spain according to methods (1), (2)
and (5), while according to methods (3) and (4), the UK
is the third most interregionally unequal country after
Italy and Spain.
We can now repeat these exercises at the TL3 level,
although there are no GDP or RDI data for the United
States at the TL3 level, and while GDP data are available
for all the eight remaining countries at the TL3 level, in
contrast RDI data are only available at the TL3 level for
the UK, Sweden, Japan and Korea.
In doing so, we now see that when using GDP per
capita, at the TL3 level the UK is the most unequal country
according to all ﬁve methods. Similarly, if we use RDI,
then amongst the reduced four-country grouping, the UK
is again the most interregionally unequal country on all
ﬁve methods.
As such, in terms of the nine-country comparison
group of countries used by both The Economist and Full-
Fact, the detailed evidence reported here therefore begs
the question as to how the FullFact article could possibly
come to the conclusion that the levels of interregional
inequality in the UK were only average by international
standards, and indeed rank only as the seventh out of the
nine countries in the comparison group? The reason that
this entirely erroneous conclusion was arrived at was
because FullFact made precisely the mistake of mixing up
different TL2 and TL3 data sets, exactly as outlined
above. Moreover, it only reported one side of the inequality
range, namely the most productive region relative to the
national average, without also examining the range includ-
ing the least productive regions.
The regional inequality bar chart constructed by Full-
Fact mixes up TL2 and TL3 areas. TL3 areas are reported
for Germany (Ingolstadt), France (Hautes-Seine),10 South
Korea,11 Italy,12 Japan, Spain and Sweden,13 with TL2
areas reported for the United States (Washington, DC)
and the UK (Greater London). The highest GDP per
capita value is reported for Ingolstadt, a small town in
Germany with a population of 133,000 people.14 The
next smallest region in the FullFact ﬁgure is the Basque
region of Alava in Spain, with a population of 324,000, fol-
lowed by Washington, DC, with a population of 680,000,
through to Greater London, with a population of 8.2
million, and Tokyo, with a population of 13.6 million.
Yet, the FullFact mixing in the same ﬁgure of TL2 and
TL3 populations of such variations makes no sense what-
soever for comparison purposes and exacerbates the pro-
blems that it claims The Economist ﬁgure originally faced.
The population range in the original ﬁgure reported by
The Economist ranged from 256,00015 in the case of Cam-
den &City of London to 13.6 million in the case of Tokyo,
a ratio of 1:53, whereas in the FullFact article that range is
now doubled to 1:102. If instead FullFact had followed its
own logic, as is made clear in the response by Selby-Boot-
hroyd, they would have recalibrated everything in TL2
terms, although this itself is not without difﬁculties, as
Selby-Boothroyd also observed.
AN OECD-WIDE COMPARATIVE
EXAMINATION OF THE UK’S
INTERREGIONAL INEQUALITIES
We can now consider these same measures and also a much
wider range of inequality measures across both the OECD
and EU where we have up to 28 total possible alternative
measures of interregional inequality.
If we begin with the absolute difference in GDP per
capita between the highest and lowest TL2 regions within
a country divided by the national GDP per capita, we see
that the UK ranks as the ﬁfth highest out of 27 countries,
behind Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Canada and
the United States. Canada’s highest values are skewed by
the oil and gas-rich arctic regions. If we also examine the
ratio of the highest and lowest GDP per capita regions,
again the UK ranks as the ﬁfth highest, after the United
States, Italy, Ireland and Slovakia. As we have seen, both
the US results depend entirely on the inclusion of the Dis-
trict of Columbia as a TL2 region. Without this, the UK is
more unequal on both measures than the United States at
the TL2 level. At the TL3 level, the UK ranks as the
most unequal country on both measures, as The Economist
observed.
In order to avoid the problem that individual obser-
vations may skew the results and also that these results
may be due to the particular small comparison group
observed by both The Economist and FullFact, we can
also use 16 other types of indicators/measures of interregio-
nal inequality across all the OECD industrialized
countries, data permitting. To begin with, we can adopt a
slightly different approach from the approach used above
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by calculating the ratio of the GDP per capita in the top
10% of regions and that of the lowest 10% of regions in
each country. For the 30 OECD industrialized countries
(not including the quasi-developing economies of Mexico,
Turkey and Chile) for which we have data, at the TL2
level, the UK is ranked as 27th in terms of inequality and
the most interregionally unequal amongst all large
countries with a population of over 11 million people. If
we consider this at the TL3 level, the UK is ranked as
the second most interregionally unequal country, and
again it is the most unequal large country.
At the same time, ifwe consider the ratio of the top20%of
regions and the bottom 20% of regions, at the TL2 level the
UK ranks as the sixth most interregional unequal economy,
and again, except for one country (Italy), the only countries
that aremore unequal than theUKare all small and/or former
Communist countries with < 11 million people, many of
which are no bigger in size than individual UK cities. At
the TL3 level, in terms of the ratio of the top 20% of regions
and the bottom20%of regions, theUKranks as theﬁfthmost
interregionally unequal country, with small and/or former
Communist countries being more unequal.
Similarly, if instead of GDP per capita we consider
GVA per worker, we see broadly the same pattern. At
the TL2 level, if we consider the ratio of the top 10%
regions and the bottom 10% of regions, we see that the
UK is the fourth most interregionally unequal economy,
while in terms of the top and bottom 20% of regions, the
UK is ranked as the ﬁfth most interregionally unequal
country. Again, in both cases, only small and former Com-
munist countries are more unequal than the UK.
In terms of GVA per worker, at the TL3 level, if we
consider the ratio of the top 10% regions and the bottom
10% of regions, we see that the UK is the second most
interregionally unequal economy, while in terms of the
top and bottom 20% of regions, at the TL3 level the UK
is ranked as the sixth most interregionally unequal country.
Again, in both cases only small and former Communist
countries are more unequal than the UK.
Finally, in terms of RDI, at the TL2 level if we consider
the ratio of the top 10% regions and the bottom 10% of
regions, we see that the UK is the fourth most interregion-
ally unequal economy; and the same is true when we con-
sider the top 20% and bottom 20% of regions, with only
Slovakia, Italy and Spain being more unequal. At the
TL3 level, the UK is the most interregionally unequal
country in RDI of the 11 OECD countries for which we
have data calculated with respect to either the top and bot-
tom 10% or 20% of regions.
Rather than looking at the top and bottom individual
regions, the top 10% and bottom 10% regions, or the top
and bottom 20% of regions, another approach to deﬁning
interregional inequality is to calculate inequality using a
Gini coefﬁcient. For GDP per capita, at the TL2 level the
UK is ranked as the 10th most interregionally unequal
country, whereas at the TL3 level, the UK is ranked as the
most unequal country of the 28 countries for which we have
data. For RDI using a Gini coefﬁcient at the TL2 level, the
UK is ranked as the ﬁfth most unequal country, while at the
TL3 level the UK is ranked as the most unequal country of
the 11OECD countries for which we have comparable data.
Another way for one to consider these issues is to use
the OECD metro urban data for the UK and other
OECD countries. However, here we have to consider
these issues in a slightly different manner to TL2 and
TL3 regions, because of the 30 OECD comparator
countries we are considering, 10 do not have more than
one OECD metropolitan urban area and another eight
countries contain fewer than ﬁve OECD metropolitan
urban area, so top/bottom 10% or 20% ratios are no differ-
ent simply to the ratios of highest and lowest metro values,
and Gini coefﬁcient calculations are largely meaningless.
Therefore, for the 19 countries for which we have compar-
able data, there are two measures: (1) we can calculate
simply the absolute difference in GDP per capita for the
highest and lowest cities and divide this value by the
national GDP per capita; and (2) we can calculate the
ratio of the GDP per capita of the highest and lowest cities.
However, we have to acknowledge that these measures
obviously suffer from exactly the same outlier/extreme
value problems in TL2 and TL3 regions for which we
instead used other measures such as top 10%/bottom
10%, top 20%/bottom 20% and Gini indices.
Allowing for these caveats, on the basis of the former
measure – the absolute difference in GDP per capita
divided by the national GDP per capita value – the UK
ranks as eighth out of 19 countries, while on the latter
measure – the ratio of top/bottom – the UK ranks as
ﬁfth highest out of 19 OECD countries.
The ﬁnal way that we can consider these issues is to use
Eurostat’s NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 regional deﬁnitions16
and compare UK interregional inequality with the other
EU countries which are also full members of the OECD.17
The OECD TL2 areas correspond to the NUTS-1 areas
for four EU countries, namely Germany, the UK, France
and Belgium, while in 14 EU countries, TL2 is the more or
less the same as the NUTS-2 classiﬁcations. For all EU
countries, the NUTS-3 area deﬁnitions largely correspond
to the OECD TL3 deﬁnitions. As such, the NUTS-2 deﬁ-
nitions typically sit between theOECDTL2 andTL3 classi-
ﬁcations. Using these NUTS regional deﬁnitions, we can
develop indicators that to some extent act as a bridge between
the OECD TL2/TL3 construction and the OECD metro
urban area construction by deﬁning those NUTS-2 and
NUTS-3 groupings that most closely replicate OECD
metro areas of 250,000 people or more as functional regions
in their own right, and distinct from other regions. This
approach more closely measures the inequalities between
large (functional) urban areas and either small town or non-
urban areas. We can examine these issues using three
measures, namely, the ratio of the highest and lowest 10%
ofGDPper capita regions, the ratio of the highest and lowest
10% of GDP per capita regions, and we can also calculate a
coefﬁcient of variation of regional GDP per capita.
Using this approach, in terms of the ratio of the highest
and lowest GDP per capita NUTS-2 regions, the UK ranks
as sixth of 22 countries, after Ireland, Germany and Italy, as
well as Slovakia and Hungary. At the NUTS-3 level, the
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UK ranks as sixth out of 20 countries, after Ireland,
Germany and Poland, as well as Slovakia and Hungary.
In terms of the GDP per capita ratio of the top 10% of
NUTS-2 regions divided by the bottom 10% of NUTS-2
regions, the UK has higher values than all Western Euro-
pean countries, except Ireland, with only Hungary and Slo-
vakia being the other two EU countries with higher ratios
than the UK.
Alternatively, if we calculate a coefﬁcient of variation for
GDP per capita at the NUTS-2 regions, now France and
Ireland are both slightly higher than the UK, and again
Hungary and Slovakia still have higher ratios. Meanwhile,
if we calculate the ratio of the GDP per capita of the top
10% of NUTS-2 regions divided by the bottom 10% of
regions at the NUTS-3 level, we see that the UK ranks as
the 11th most interregionally unequal country out of 22
behind six former Communist countries plus Ireland,
Italy, France and Germany. On the other hand, if we calcu-
late a coefﬁcient of variation for GDP per capita at the
NUTS-3 regions, again we see that the UK is the 11th
most interregionally unequal country in Europe out of 22
EU and OECD countries behind ﬁve former Communist
countries plus France, Italy, Greece and Ireland. In these
particular types of NUTS rankings, the UK displays lower
inequalities between large urban areas and either small
town or non-urban areas than in countries such as France,
as is already well known (Dijkstra, Garcilazo, & McCann,
2013; McCann, 2016).18 Inequality in the UK is much
more of a regional than an urban/non-urban phenomenon
(McCann, 2016), with many of the most prosperous places
in the UK being small towns and rural areas (ONS, 2017)
and many of the least prosperous places being urban areas.
Indeed, as explained in Appendix A in the supplemental
data online, one-third of theUK’s large urban areas are actu-
ally poorer than their own hinterlands and one-ﬁfth are only
very slightly more prosperous than their hinterlands, two-
thirds of the UK large cities are less prosperous than the
UK average, and the productivity growth of many of these
has almost completely stalled since the 2008 crisis (Martin,
Sunley, Gardiner, Evenhuis, & Tyler, 2018).
DISCUSSION
All these various results are summarized in Table 1, which
reports each individual measure of interregional inequality
and the UK’s inequality ranking out of the range of
countries for which comparable data are available. A
higher ranking means that the UK is relatively more
unequal on that particular measure. What we see is that
across all 28 indicators the UK has a high ranking of inter-
regional inequality. In terms of the country comparisons
employed by both The Economist and FullFact, when we
consider interregional inequality across all the available
TL2, TL3, metro urban and NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 indi-
cators, we see that across all 28 indicators the UK is more
interregionally unequal than the United States on six
measures, while the United States is more unequal than
the UK on ﬁve measures, and they are equal on two
measures. However, if the District of Columbia is
removed for the reasons outlined above, the United States
is more interregionally unequal compared with the UK on
four measures, while the UK is more unequal compared
with the United States on nine measures, and they are
equal according to one measure. Similarly, the UK is
more interregionally unequal than France according to
15 measures, and France is more unequal than the UK
on four measures, and they are equal on two measures;
Germany is more unequal to the UK according to four
measures, while the UK is more unequal than Germany
on 17 measures. Italy is more interregionally unequal to
the UK on 10 measures, while the UK is more interre-
gionally unequal than Italy on 11 measures. The UK is
interregionally more unequal to Japan on 18 measures.
Spain is more interregionally unequal than the UK accord-
ing to three measures, while the UK is more unequal to
Spain according to 19 measures. The UK is more interre-
gionally unequal than South Korea according to 16
measures, while South Korea is more unequal to the UK
on two measures. Finally, the UK is interregionally more
unequal than Sweden on 16 different measures. In other
words, across all the indicators used, the UK comes out
as the most interregionally unequal country amongst this
particular group of large advanced industrial economies.
Indeed, what comes out when we compare the UK with
30 OECD countries is that the UK is one of the most
interregionally unequal countries in the industrialized
world, and almost certainly the most interregionally
unequal large high-income country. The only countries
that are interregionally more unequal than the UK are Slo-
vakia and Ireland.19 In other words, across a very broad
range of 28 indicators, the UK is interregionally more
unequal than 28 other advanced OECD countries.20
Amongst its own particular competitor peer group of
large countries with similar or higher levels of income,
the UK is much more unequal interregionally than any of
its peers. Only Italy, with its longstanding problems of
the Mezzogiorno, has somewhat nearly comparable inter-
regional inequalities with that of the UK, although Italy’s
measures are very dependent on the fact that three of the
four richest TL2 and NUTS-2 regions of Italy only have
very small populations.21 Meanwhile, the small number
of measures where Germany is more unequal than the
UK is entirely a legacy of the absorption of the former
East Germany. All other rich OECD countries are much
more interregionally equal than the UK. As such, in
many ways the economic geography of the UK is more
reminiscent of a much poorer country at an earlier stage
of economic development (McCann, 2016). Moreover,
the inequalities within the UK are also across such short
distances with enormous local productivity variations evi-
dent within just a two-hour driving time, whereas within
Spain comparable variations would only be evident across
a seven-hour driving time, and in Italy and the United
States across a 10-hour driving time. In the UK, it is the
combination both of the magnitude and the proximity of
the interregional inequalities that is so marked, and the
productivity weakness of many regions of the UK acts as
a severe drag on national productivity.
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper has outlined the key issues involved when con-
sidering the national scale of interregional imbalances using
different indices, spatial units and measures of regional
inequality. A broad internationally comparative approach
is advocated that involves considering as wide a range as
possible of such indicators, while at the same time also
being aware of the construction, purposes, advantages
and limitations of each individual indicator. This type of
broad approach better allows the realities of an individual
country to be situated in an internationally comparable
context.
Understanding these realities is also important for
understanding many aspects of the ‘geography of discon-
tent’. Major differences in local productivity are a primary
source of the geography of discontent and they are also a
challenge to a country’s institutional and governance struc-
tures. International evidence demonstrates that interregio-
nal inequality is neither beneﬁcial for urban (Royuela,
Ramos, & Veneri, 2014) or regional growth (de Dominicis,
2014) and that decentralized governance systems are
associated with more interregionally equal growth patterns
(Ezcurra & Pasqual, 2008; Ezcurra & Rodriguez-Pose,
2013), less dominance by an individual city-region
(OECD, 2015), and with no effect on national growth.
As such, it is likely that the enormous imbalances within
the UK are heavily related to the over-centralized national
governance system (McCann, 2016) and a signiﬁcant
devolution and decentralization of the UK national–subna-
tional governance system would appear to be a key priority
for helping to counter the geography of discontent.
Table 1. UK interregional inequality rankings (number of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and
European Union countries with comparable data).
Ratio top/bottom OECD
TL2 regions GDP per
capita
Difference top/bottom
OECD TL2 area GDP per
capita divided by
national GDP per capita
Ratio top/bottom OECD
TL3 regions GDP per
capita
Difference top/bottom
OECD TL3 area GDP
per capita divided by
national GDP per
capita
Ratio top 10%/bottom
10% OECD TL2 regions
GDP per capita
5/27 5/27 1/26 1/26 4/26
Ratio top 20%/bottom
20% OECD TL2 regions
GDP per capita
Ratio top 10%/bottom
10% OECD TL3 regions
GDP per capita
Ratio top 20%/bottom
20% OECD TL2 regions
GDP per capita
Ratio top 10%/bottom
10% OECD TL2 regions
GVA per worker
Ratio top 20%/bottom
20% OECD TL2 regions
GVA per worker
6/26 2/27 4/26 2/25 5/25
Ratio top 10%/bottom
10% OECD TL3 regions
GVA per worker
Ratio top 20%/bottom
20% OECD TL3 regions
GVA per worker
Ratio top 10%/bottom
10% OECD TL2 regions
RDI per person
Ratio top 20%/bottom
20% OECD TL2 regions
RDI per person
Ratio top 10%/bottom
10% OECD TL3 regions
RDI per person
3/27 6/27 4/27 4/27 1/11
Ratio top 20%/bottom
20% OECD TL3 regions
RDI per person
Gini index regional GDP
per capita OECD TL2
regions
Gini index regional GDP
per capita OECD TL3
regions
Gini index regional RDI
per capita OECD TL2
regions
Gini index regional RDI
per capita OECD TL3
regions
1/11 9/26 1/27 5/26 1/11
Difference top/bottom
OECD metro urban area
GDP per capita divided
by national GDP per
capita
Ratio top/bottom OECD
metro urban area GDP
per capita
Ratio top/bottom GDP
per capita EU NUTS-2
region (including metro
urban regions)
Ratio top/bottom GDP
per capita EU NUTS-3
region (including
metro urban regions)
Ratio top 10%/bottom
10% GDP per capita EU
NUTS-2 regions
(including metro urban
regions)
8/19 5/19 6/20 6/22 4/22
Ratio top 10%/bottom
10% GDP per capita EU
NUTS-3 regions
(including metro urban
regions)
Coefﬁcient of variation
GDP per capita EU
NUTS-2 regions
(including metro urban
regions)
Coefﬁcient of variation
GDP per capita EU
NUTS-3 regions
(including metro urban
regions)
11/22 5/23 11/22
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However, this is especially difﬁcult In the case of the UK,
for three reasons.
. There is the overwhelming geographical myopia of
London-centric ‘national’ media debates. Given the
data discussed in this paper, which are all publicly avail-
able, it is very hard to understand how FullFact could
have put forward the argument that UK interregional
inequality is only average by international standards,
and it is even harder to understand how high-proﬁle
frontline political and media commentators could have
so readily accepted this argument. Indeed, these mista-
ken perceptions underline the scale of the governance–
devolution challenge ahead.
. These difﬁculties are further compounded by the
effects of Brexit, which are likely to undermine many
economic and governance efforts aimed at galvanizing
the UK’s weaker regions (Billing, McCann, & Ortega-
Argilés, 2019), even in situations where central gov-
ernment would like to be able to devolve and
decentralize.
. A recently popular UK response to questions of the
geography of discontent that is largely driven by pse-
phological approaches, has advanced a ‘cities versus
towns’ narrative (Jennings, Brett, Bua, & Laurence,
2017). As the data reported here show, this character-
ization is basically untrue in terms of the economic
features of the UK. This political science narrative,
which is already gaining traction in the media and pol-
itical circles, adds yet another layer of resistance to a
proper reconsideration and reorganization of the
relationships between the UK regional economic and
governance systems.
An improved general awareness of regional economic
realities is essential for overcoming inaccurate national
media and political narratives, and this is true both in the
case of the UK and also in many other countries. The
OECD and EU regional and urban data sets are an invalu-
able resource.
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NOTES
1. See https://twitter.com/i/moments/105974147638777
8560?lang=en/.
2. See https://fullfact.org/economy/regional-inequality-
ﬁgures-misleading/.
3. Technically, Stockholm County’s 2017 population is
2,269,090.
4. The population of Manhattan at 1.67 million rep-
resents 0.51% of the US population of 326 million. In rela-
tive terms, the equivalent population for the UK would be
339,000, or almost exactly the same size as the TL3 area of
Kensington & Chelsea (London) (338,960) and slightly
larger than the TL3 area of Camden & City of London
(258,655).
5. See https://medium.economist.com/the-challenges-of
-charting-regional-inequality-a9376718348/.
6. In the UK, it is known as the Barnett Formula.
7. Measuring output per hour worked is also an option, but
this ignored all the labour market participation features. By
using such a measure at standardized geographical units, we
still see that theUK ismore interregionally unequal than half
a dozen other EU comparator countries. See https://blog.
ons.gov.uk/2018/11/23/mind-the-gap-why-the-uk-might
-not-be-the-most-regionally-unequal-country/.
8. See http://www.oecd.org/cfe/regional-policy/regionals
tatisticsandindicators.htm/.
9. For details, see Appendix in Appendix A in the sup-
plemental data online.
10. Hautes-Seine’s population is 1.61 million.
11. Ulsan’s population is 1.15 million.
12. Milan’s population is 3.2 million.
13. See note 3.
14. A town that most regular visitors to Germany have
never heard of.
15. 2015 population data.
16. See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/backgrou
nd/.
17. We do not include Romania or Bulgaria as compara-
tors for similar reasons that we did not include Mexico,
Turkey or Chile in the previous discussions of OECD
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TL2 and TL3 data. Also, Malta, Cyprus and Croatia are
very small countries that are not full members of the
OECD, so these are not included either.
18. Within the UK, the gaps between urban metropolitan
regions and either small town or rural areas were falling
between 2000 and 2007, although they have all very slightly
risen since the crisis of 2008.
19. Slovakia is more interregionally unequal than the UK
according to 14 measures; it is equal to the UK on two
measures; and the UK is more unequal to Slovakia in
eight measures. Ireland is more interregionally unequal
than the UK according to 13 measures; while the UK is
interregionally more unequal than Ireland on 12 measures.
20. Poland displays equivalent interregional inequality to the
UK. It is more interregionally unequal than the UK according
to 10 measures; the UK is more interregionally unequal than
Poland on 10 measures; and they are both equal on two
measures.
21. The richest TL2 region, Bolzano-Bozen, has a popu-
lation of 524,256; Trento’s population is 538,604; and Val
d’Aosta’s population is 126,883.
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